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December 1988 Introduction 
This paper examines whether state and federal grant policies induce 
local governments to substitute new investment for the maintenance of 
existing capital,  resulting in excessive deterioration  of public 
infrastructure.  Using a new data set on the maintenance policies of local 
mass-transit  providers,  it shows that private owners of transit capital 
equipment devote significantly greater resources to maintenance than do 
public owners of similar capital.  I measure the elasticity of maintenance 
with respect to capital subsidy rates using this public/private 
differential and using cross-state  variation in capital subsidy policies. 
The results, which are corroborated in a companion analysis of scrappage in 
the public and private sectors,  support the position that publicly owned 
capital deteriorates faster than similar private capital because of state 
and federal grant policies. 
The condition of public infrastructure received much political and 
media attention in the early 1980s.  This interest was sparked in part by 
Pat Choate and Susan Walter's book,  America in Ruins,  which gave striking 
examples of crumbling infrastructure, and by tragedies such as the 1983 
collapse of the Interstate 95 bridge in Connecticut.  Major studies by the 
Urban Institute and the Congressional Budget Office  (1983)  catalogued the 
existing state of public infrastructure and projected the need for new 
public investment. Dilapidated infrastructure,  however, does not necessarily point to 
government inefficiency.  Equipment and structures have specified design 
lives,  and crumbling capital could merely reflect the age of the existing 
capital stock.  Leonard (1985),  however,  argues that federal grant 
policies,  combined with budget rules and political pressures, induce local 
governments to systematically underfund maintenance.  He identifies the 
resulting excessive deterioration of public infrastructure as the principal 
source of the recent "infrastructure crisis." 
While the rate of depreciation of physical assets is assumed to be a 
constant technical parameter in most empirical studies of investment,  a 
small body of literature argues that utilization and maintenance have 
important effects on the rate of capital deterioration.  Drawing on this 
literature,  and on models of bureaucratic behavior,  this paper presents a 
model of maintenance and investment that more formally illustrates 
Leonard's arguments.  While possible effects of bureaucratic behavior and 
political and budgetary pressures are briefly discussed, this paper focuses 
on the potentially large distortions that result from massive 
intergovernmental subsidies for capital purchases by local governments. 
The impact of state and federal grant structure on the maintenance 
efforts of local governments is examined using data on the maintenance 
policies of both publicly and privately owned local mass-transit providers. 
The data were collected by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
(UMTA).  Previous research into the maintenance efforts of local governments has been  hampered by the lack of consist'ent  measures of public 
capital and maintenance efforts.  The UMTA data set,  however, contains 
extensive information on vehicle fleets as well as expenditures and labor 
hours for vehicle maintenance.  Furthermore,  local transit-system 
heterogeneity provides useful natural experimental variation for comparing 
the maintenance policies of public versus private transit providers. 
The results show that privately owned transit companies devote some 
14 to 17 percent more labor hours to maintenance than do publicly owned and 
managed transit companies.  This public/private differential,  along with 
cross-state variation in grant policies, is used to measure the elasticity 
of maintenance with respect to capital subsidies.  The point estimates 
suggest an elasticity of -0.16,  meaning that a 10 percent increase in the 
subsidy rate for transit capital reduces vehicle maintenance by 1.6 
percent.  In a companion paper, Cromwell (1988), I examine the hazard rates 
for retirement and scrappage of public and private equipment and find 
evidence that federal capital grant policies lead to shorter equipment life 
in the local public sector. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews previous 
studies of government efficiency and discusses the extension to analysis of 
depreciation and maintenance.  Section I1 presents a model of public 
investment and maintenance that serves as a framework for the empirical 
analysis.  Section I11 discusses the application of this analysis to the 
mass transit industry and discusses the data set used in the empirical work.  Section IV presents empirical evidence concerning the maintenance 
policies of public versus private transit providers.  Section V discusses 
variation in subsidy policies across states and presents an estimate of the 
elasticity of maintenance with respect to capital subsidies.  Finally, 
Section VI presents conclusions and briefly discusses the scrappage results 
from the companion paper. I.  Public Sector Efficiencv and Capital Maintenance 
Public Sector Efficiency 
Discussions of public good provision often assume that public 
bureaucrats are selfless persons who efficiently provide the level of 
goods desired by the public.  The level of public goods demanded is assumed 
to be revealed through majority voting or some other political process. 
The public choice literature,  however,  holds that public officials and 
bureaucrats have objectives that diverge from maximizing public welfare. 
This literature explores whether government overproduces goods and services 
and whether government is cost-efficient in the level of services it does 
produce. 
The overproduction  debate stems from Niskanen's (1975)  model of 
bureaucracy.  Niskanen posits that a bureaucracy maximizes the level of 
service it provides  (hence  the size of its budget) subject to its 
production constraints and to the total amount of resources that its 
political superiors will provide.  Since an agency negotiates with 
political leaders over a total budget as opposed to incremental units of 
service, and since the agency is often the sole provider of the service,  it 
can use its monopoly power to establish a level of service greater than 
that desired by voters.  Whether local governments adequately reflect the 
desires of the median voter,  or whether the level of government services 
exceeds the wishes of the median voter as Niskanen's model predicts, 
remains controversial.  1 While the service-maximizing model implies that bureaucrats minimize 
production costs per unit of service,  work by Migue and Belanger  (1974)  and 
Orzechowski  (1977)  explicitly recognizes that bureaucrats desire higher 
wages,  fringe benefits,  and staff levels and will use their monopoly powers 
to obtain them.  While these models imply that local government production 
is labor-intensive,  De Allesi  (1969)  argues that budget-minded bureaus 
favor production methods that are capital-intensive,  since these methods 
tend to concentrate a larger proportion of costs over a shorter time 
horizon.  In either case,  bureaucratic preference for capital or labor 
results in production decisions that are no longer cost-minimizing. 
Empirical work usually compares public versus private provision of 
similar services and in general shows significant cost savings from 
privatization.  Bennett and Johnson  (1979)  found a 32-percent saving in 
garbage collection costs in Fairfax,  Virginia.  Ahlbrandt  (1973)  documented 
a 50-percent saving in fire protection costs in Scottsdale,  Arizona. 
Davies  (1971)  showed 13 percent lower costs in a privately operated airline 
in Australia compared with its public competitor.  The technique of private 
versus public comparison is used in the empirical work that follows. 
Ca~ital  Maintenance 
This paper does not address the questions of whether government 
overproduces or is labor-  or capital-intensive in production.  Instead,  I ask whether capital services used for production are provided in a cost- 
minimizing manner or,  alternatively,  whether government efficiently manages 
the stock of capital from which capital services flow. 
Leonard  (1985)  argues that several institutional,  political, and 
financial aspects of local governments may distort maintenance and capital 
procurement policies away from the cost-minimizing ones.  First,  capital 
budgeting procedures for local governments,  if they exist, use inadequate 
measures of capital and depreciation.  More important,  maintenance is 
counted as an operating expense.  Since the costs of deferred maintenance 
are not felt until later,  Leonard argues that these budget procedures 
encourage public officials to underfund maintenance.  This tendency is more 
pronounced when public officials and bureaucrats operate under short time 
horizons because of budgetary or political pressures.  Finally,  federal 
grant policies heavily subsidize the acquisition of new capital as opposed 
to maintenance of existing infrastructure,  a policy that encourages local 
governments to neglect maintenance of current infrastructure in favor of 
purchasing new capital goods. 
Bureaucrats may also derive utility from new investment.  Weingast, 
et al.  (1981)  present a model of legislative behavior in which the 
geographic incidence of benefits and costs systematically biases public 
decisions toward larger-  than-eff  icient projects.  Capital projects give 
benefits directly to a small group, while their costs are widely 
distributed.  Possible sources of utility from capital projects for public officials include kickbacks, political support,  and contributions from 
direct project beneficiaries.  Leonard  (1985)  emphasizes the political 
benefit that comes from being associated with large and visible investment 
projects, a "ribbon-cutting" effect.  Such effects further encourage the 
substitution  of investment for maintenance. 
Treatment of Depreciation 
In empirical investment studies, depreciation is commonly considered 
to take the form of "output decay," in which equipment productivity 
decreases at a constant exponential rate over time.*  This assumption 
yields mathematical tractability and results in a constant replacement 
investment ratio.  Feldstein and Rothschild (1974),  however,  argue that the 
conditions for a constant rate of depreciation are overly stringent and 
that shifts in tax policy change equipment life and scrappage rates, 
resulting in a nonconstant replacement-investment  ratio.  Feldstein's 
analysis of equipment life follows the standard treatment of Jorgenson, 
McCall,  and Radnor  (1967)  in which the flow of capital services from a 
piece of equipment is assumed to be constant over time, but in which 
operating, maintenance,  and reliability costs increase at a constant rate 
with equipment age.  The optimization problem is to find the equipment life 
that minimizes the discounted stream of operating and replacement costs 
over time.  Depreciation occurs in the form of "input decay," in which the 
input costs per unit of service increase with age while maintenance is just 
qn operating expense, providing no future benefits. An alternative approach assumes that depreciation takes the "output 
decay" form but depends on the level of maintenance and the rate of 
utilization.  Maintenance retards the rate of decay of existing capital and 
increases the level of capital in future periods;  it is therefore a type of 
investment.  The decision-maker  can preserve the existing stock of capital 
today or purchase new capital tomorrow.  Depreciation is not a technical 
constant,  but is determined through optimizing behavior.  Nadiri and Rosen 
(1969)  demonstrate the importance of the interaction between capital 
utilization and investment,  while Bitros  (1976)  estimates the impact of 
maintenance on investment decisions.  Schworm  (1979)  demonstrates how 
utilization and maintenance decisions are affected by tax policies.  These 
studies argue that empirical analyses of investment that assume constant 
depreciation and replacement investment are misspecified.  I use this 
approach to illustrate how public managers' maintenance decisions are 
potentially distorted,  resulting in an inefficient rate of deterioration of 
capital assets.  3 11.  A Model of Investment and Maintenance 
This section shows how state and federal grant policies potenti3lly 
distort maintenance decisions from their optimal level.  It begins with a 
simple input-choice model that addresses the question of how a firm or 
local government can efficiently provide a desired flow of capital 
services.  The optimal maintenance level in this setting depends on 
relative prices and on the time preference rate.  Capital grant policies, 
by altering the relative price of new capital,  distort the maintenance 
decision. 
Consider a local government that seeks to provide a desired flow of 
capital services kit  from t = 1,.  . . ,.o  at minimum cost.  The desired 
services k*, are assumed proportional to a desired capital stock 
K*. The cost of providing capital services in any period t is the 
sum of  new investment and maintenance costs, 
(1)  Cost, = qtI, + PtMt, 
where q  is the price of investment, I,  is investment, Pt  is the 
t 
price of maintenance, and 4  is maintenance. 
The stock of capital in period t+l equals new investment plus the 
capital stock from period t left after depreciation.  4 The capital stock and investment in the initial period t=O are assumed to 
be fixed at KO  and I,,  respectively. 
All capital depreciates at the same rate 6,.  This rate,  however, 
is affected by the level of maintenance per unit of capital and,  as such, 
is not constant over time.  Maintenance per unit of capital, q,  reduces 
the rate of depreciation,  but at a decreasing rate. 
Assuming perfect certainty,  the local government's problem is to 
minimize objective function  (4)  over a flow of maintenance and investment 
subject to Kt = K*, and to conditions  (2)  and  (3). 
1  (4)  Min  f  pt  [  + %I,]  where p = - 
t=O  i+e 
Future costs are discounted by a rate of time preference e.  For a 
surplus-maximizing  community, this rate is its effective borrowing rate. As discussed below,  however,  bureaucrats and public officials may discount 
future costs and benefits at a higher rate because of political or fiscal 
pressures.  For private firms, 9  is assumed to be the after-tax interest 
rate.  5 
The first-order conditions for this problem are 
ptPt +  At&,  = 0  and 
The first-order condition for M,  and It+1  can be solved to 
illustrate the trade-off between maintenance of existing capital  (this 
period) and investment in new capital  (next  period).  The ratio of the 
prices equals the ratio at which maintenance in period t and investment in 
period t+l  create capital in period t+l. 
This equation can be solved for the optimal maintenance level as a 
function of the price of maintenance,  the price of new investment,  and the 
discount rate. Standard comparative static analysis of  (7)  yields 
and 
where 
Maintenance is decreasing in the price of maintenance,  increasing in the 
price of new investment,  and decreasing in the discount rate. 
These results can be used to predict relative maintenance levels for 
two types of service providers: a profit-maximizing firm and a community- 
surplus-maximizing local government.  Table 1 outlines differences between 
these two models in discount rates, investment prices, and maintenance 
wages. Table 1 
Private Versus Local Public Sector: 














Source  : author'  s calculations. 
Since profit-maximizing firms can deduct interest payments from 
taxable income,  their effective discount rate is the after-tax interest 
rate  (1  -  r)r.  The discount rate for a surplus-maximizing local 
government would be its effective municipal borrowing rate r,.  There 
are good reasons to suspect,  however,  that the rate at which public 
decision-makers discount future costs and benefits exceeds r,.  Cohen 
and No11  (1984)  demonstrate that legislators maximizing the probability of 
reelection seek to defer costs.  Furthermore,  local budget procedures often 
ignore future costs and benefits. Leonard  (1985)  argues that capital budgets,  if they exist,  use 
inadequate measures of capital and depreciation while officials 
are often legally constrained to meet balanced operating budgets year to 
year.  This discounting of future costs is enhanced in times of fiscal 
pressures.  Section IV examines differences in maintenance outcomes due to 
such effects by comparing transit systems run by city governments with 
those operated by independent authorities or managed by private 
consultants. 
The effective price of investment for a private firm is the 
investment price q minus the present value of any investment tax credit and 
deductions for depreciation,  (1  -  c -  rz)q, where c is the investment tax 
credit and rz is the per-dollar present value of depreciation deductions. 
Local governments,  on the other hand,  often receive substantial matching 
federal subsidies for new capital goods.  In mass transit,  for example,  the 
federal government pays up to 80 percent of the cost of new investment. 
Furthermore, many states also subsidize the local share. 
My survey of state policies identified five states that pay the 
entire remaining 20 percent,  resulting in an effective capital price of 
zero.  Ten other states also contributed between 10 and 20 percent 
subsidies for transit capital.  The effective price of new capital for a 
surplus-maximizing local government is thus  (1  -  GCf  -  GCS)q, 
where G~~  and GCS  are the matching federal and state grant rates 
for capital expenses,  respectively.  The price of maintenance faced by I  local governments in most cases is the nominal price Vt. In  certain 
instances,  however,  local governments are subsidized at the margin for 
operating expenses and the effective price of maintenance is 
(1  -  Gof  -  GO~)V,,  where Gof  and Gos  are the marginal 
subsidies for operating expenses from the federal and state governments, 
respectively.  Since firms can deduct maintenance expenses from taxable 
income,  the effective maintenance price for the private sector is 
(1  -  r)Vt. 
If the present value of the investment tax credit and depreciation 
deductions equals the value of being able to write off investment 
immediately -- that is,  if (1-7)  =  (1  -  c -  rz) --  the ratio of prices 
facing the private firm is undistorted.  Similarly,  for the public sector, 
if the marginal subsidy for operating expenses equals the marginal subsidy 
for capital - -  that is,  if  (1  -  GCf  -  GCS)  =  (1  -  Gof  -  Gos) - - 
relative prices are undistorted.  Massive subsidies for capital in the 
local public sector,  however,  imply a large distortion in relative prices 
and suggest that their maintenance efforts will be lower than in the 
private sector. 
Judgments about the relative efficiency of these providers depend on 
assumptions as to the appropriate social discount rate and about the 
relative strengths of the distortions mentioned above.  If one assumes, 
however, that the distortions faced by a private firm between maintenance and investment are small compared to those in the public sector and that 
the after-tax interest rate is a reasonable approximation of the social 
discount rate, then maintenance efforts of private firms represent a 
natural benchmark with which to evaluate the maintenance policies of local 
governments. 111.  De~reciation  Com~arison  for Local Mass Transit 
The local mass-transit industry is the focus of the empirical 
analysis for several reasons.  First,  the production processes of transit 
providers are relatively homogeneous and their inputs  (labor  hours and 
vehicle miles) are measurable,  facilitating comparisons of cost-efficiency 
across transit providers.  Second, the flow of transit capital services, 
assumed here to be annual vehicle miles,  is also relatively homogeneous and 
easily measured.  Combined with data on expenses and labor hours for 
maintenance,  this permits comparison of maintenance per unit of capital. 
Finally,  transit service is provided by a heterogeneous set of 
institutions--including  city governments,  regional authorities,  public 
agencies managed by private concerns,  and wholly private operators.  These 
providers receive revenues from a wide variety of sources, including fares, 
federal operating assistance,  state and federal capital grants, local 
general revenues,  and local dedicated taxes.  This heterogeneity enables me 
to control for variations in operating conditions and to measure the impact 
of subsidies and institutional settings on maintenance policies. 
Data  - 
The data source for this work is the Section 15 Reporting System 
administered by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration  (UMTA). 
Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act  (UMT  Act) establishes a 
uniform accounting system for public mass-transportation  finances and operations.  All applicants and direct beneficiaries of federal assistance 
under Section 9 of the UMT Act are subject to this system and are required 
to file annual reports with UMTA.  7 
Section 15 data for fiscal year (FY)  1979 through FY  1984 are 
available for some 435 transit systems and include detailed information on 
revenue sources, expenses, employees,  and hours and miles of service 
8  provided.  These data provide an unprecedented view of a cross-section 
of local government entities that perform similar activities.  The revenue 
data are broken into revenues from both transit operations and public 
subsidies, including information on federal, state, and local contributions 
for operations and capital procurement.  Dedicated state and local revenues 
are identified. 
The expense data are broken down into wages,  fringe benefits, 
materials, and services for the areas of administration,  operations,  and 
maintenance.  Data on labor hours for types of employees are provided as 
well.  Using the expense and employee data, average salary rates can be 
constructed for the different types of employees.  Vehicle inventories for 
each system are broken down by model,  year of manufacture,  and mileage, 
providing an unusually detailed cross-section of data on publicly owned 
physical assets.  Finally,  operating statistics include data on passengers, 
vehicle miles, and vehicle hours.  The detailed data on maintenance 
employee hours,  maintenance expenses,  vehicle miles, and vehicle 
inventories are of particular interest for this work. Federal Transit Policies 
The federal government plays an important role in financing the 
local public mass-transportation  industry.  The largest component of 
federal transit aid is the Section 3 discretionary grant program, which 
provides up to 75 percent of approved capital expenditures by local transit 
authorities.  A majority of these grants go to large transit systems with 
rail systems for major construction projects and expansions.  The principal 
federal grant program for properties that operate only bus lines,  however, 
is the Section 9 formula grant program,  which distributes funds to 
urbanized areas for use in transit operating and capital expenditures. 
Because UMTA seeks to wean local properties away from operating 
assistance, the Surface Transportation Act of 1982 capped the level of 
funds available for operating assistance for FY 1983 and beyond to some 90 
percent of the FY 1982 level,  or to 50 percent of a property's operating 
deficit,  whichever was lower.  The overwhelming majority of public transit 
properties are constrained by the cap and receive no operating assistance 
on the margin.  The Section 9 capital funds are principally used for 
vehicle replacement and pay up to 80 percent of the cost of a new vehicle. 
Federal control over maintenance principally consists of setting an 
upper limit for deterioration of federally purchased equipment.  UMTA 
requires local transit properties to operate buses purchased with federal 
funds for at least 12 years or 500,000  miles.  Failure to do so results 
in a penalty in federal assistance for new capital purchases.  This 12-year limit,  however, is below the potential operating life of 15 to 20 years for 
standard bus models.  UMTA also requires that the number of spare vehicles 
available at periods of maximum service be no higher than 20 percent, thus 
putting an  upper limit on the fleet size.  This guideline,  however,  is not 
as rigorously enforced as the 12-year vehicle life guideline.  10 
My discussions with .transit  professionals have yielded ample 
anecdotal evidence that, in spite of UMTA regulations,  inadequate 
maintenance can lead to rapid depreciation  of bus equipment.  In St. Louis, 
the Bi-State Transportation Agency attempted to trade in a set of AM 
General buses after nine years claiming that they were "lemons."  UMTA 
disagreed and forced Bi-State to make needed repairs to keep them operating 
or to buy out the UMTA share.  In 1983 the New York Metropolitan  Transit 
Authority convinced UMTA that the recurring problems with their recently 
purchased Grumman advanced-design  buses were due to the manufacturer's 
design.  New York was allowed to replace these buses with federal 
assistance.  The Grummans,  however,  were resold to some smaller transit 
agencies such as Pioneer Valley Transit in Springfield,  MA,  who report 
having no problems with them. 
These anecdotes suggest that maintenance practices can lead to rapid 
deterioration  of equipment in the public sector.  It is important, however, 
to distinguish between variations in maintenance and depreciation 
attributable to unavoidable operating conditions,  and variations due to 
capital grant policies or bureaucratic behavior that are potential sources of government inefficiency.  The empirical work that follows attempts to 
identify these separate effects. IV.  Public Versus Private Maintenance Efforts 
The variation in institutional settings for transit providers allows 
for natural experiments on vehicle maintenance policies.  In my first set 
of tests,  I examine the impact of three distinct types of providers: 
transit systems run by city governments,  transit systems managed by private 
management companies,  and wholly private transit companies.  The control 
group of transit systems are those run by independent transit districts or 
regional authorities. 
Transit systems managed by city governments are of interest, because 
their immediate superiors are elected officials and because they compete 
with other city services for the same revenues.  They may have higher rates 
of time-preference  and are perhaps subject to a greater "ribbon-cutting" 
effect than the control group.  This suggests that maintenance efforts will 
be lower for city providers.  11 
Transit systemsmanaged  by private consultants provide a second 
natural test of the model.  These consultants,  such as American Transit 
Enterprises  (ATE)  of Cincinnati,  Ohio, provide top management and technical 
and professional backup service to public transit systems for a fixed fee. 
While decisions on the level of service are made by the public superiors, 
operation and maintenance decisions are made by the managers under standard 
company policies which they claim reflect professionally accepted 
practices.  Discussions with ATE suggest that this results in greater planning and reduced political pressure.  Because manager promotion is 
based on professional considerations,  decision-makers  are less likely to be 
subject to political pressures than the control group.  While ATE may not 
be able to systematically disregard its client's wishes,  ATE has a 
reputation for good maintenance; thus, a public property's selection of ATE 
could signal tastes for a professionally run and well-maintained  system. 
Furthermore, the use of a private management firm allows public officials 
to avoid responsibility for adverse maintenance outcomes by claiming that 
their hands are tied. 
Finally,  the maintenance policies of privately owned transit systems 
are of interest as a natural benchmark to evaluate the policies of public 
properties for reasons discussed in section 11.  Public transit properties 
receive enormous capital subsidies on the margin,  while marginal operating 
subsidies are uncommon.  The model therefore predicts that private 
maintenance efforts will exceed those of public systems. 
My initial empirical work examines a cross-section  of Section 15 
data for FY 1984 from 122 transit properties.  The sample consists of 
single-mode bus operators -- properties that provide only fixed-route bus 
service as opposed to rail or demand-response service -- that operated at 
least five revenue vehicles.  Included in this sample are 27 properties 
operated by city governments,  18 properties managed by ATE,  and 22 
privately owned properties.  These private properties consist of 12 in the 
New York metropolitan area with the rest scattered across the country.  12 Their inclusion in the Section 15 data results from contracting with a 
public recipient of Section 9 funds to provide transit services.  As these 
contracts often provide for the leasing of public vehicles,  care is taken 
in the following analysis to distinguish between mileage on leased vehicles 
versus those owned by the private operators. 
Table 2 reports sample means for maintenance expenses and 
maintenance employees, scaled by annual vehicle miles.  In general, the 
average levels of both expenses and labor hours follow the predicted 
patterns.  The private systems on average spend 45 percent more on 
maintenance per mile and devote 29 percent more labor hours to maintenance 
than do the public systems.  Within the public sector,  city governments 
spend 8 percent less than transit authorities,  while ATE-managed properties 
spend 9 percent more.  The pattern for labor hours is slightly different, 
with city governments devoting 5 percent more than average and ATE-managed 
properties devoting 7 percent more. 
The means shown in table 2,  while consistent with the predicted 
results regarding the private and ATE-managed operators, do not control for 
systematic differences due to wages,  operating conditions,  and fleet 
composition.  In particular, the average age of vehicles in private systems 
is substantially higher than that for public fleets,  with 38.4  percent of 
the private fleets being more than 12 years old compared to 22.0 percent of 
the public fleets.  The distribution of vehicles weighted by miles is 
similar,  with 26.7 and 11.2  percent of the mileage being run on vehicles Table 2 
Vehicle Maintenance Expenses and Labor Hours* 
------------------PUBLIC--------------- 
Public  City  Transit  ATE- 
PRIVATE  Total  Owned  Auth.  Managed 
Expenses per  0.77 
mile  ($1.00)  (0.12) 
Labor hours  37.8 
per1,OOOmiles  (3.6) 
Labor hours  38.9 
per 1,000  miles  (3.7) 
(Adjusted) 
Percent expense  2.8 
contracted out  (1.1) 
Percent expense  67.8 
for labor  (3.5) 
Percent of fleet  38.4 
> 12 years old 
Percent mileage  26.7 
on vehicles 
> 12 years old 
NOTE: Number  22  100  27  55  18 
of Observations 
* 1984 cross-section  sample means  (standard  errors). 
Source: author's calculations. older than 12 years for the private and public systems,  respectively.  The 
older fleet in the private systems is consistent with privately owned 
capital deteriorating slower than publicly owned capital as a result of 
greater maintenance efforts.  It is also consistent with the view,  however, 
that increased maintenance efforts by the private systems merely reflect 
the fact that they operate older fleets.  In the empirical analysis that 
follows,  I  attempt to control for the age composition of the vehicle fleet. 
For regression analysis,  I increased the sample size to 387 
observations by pooling the 1984 cross-section  with 1983 and 1982 cross- 
sections of 125 and 140 properties,  respectively.  Only 76 properties 
appeared in all three cross-sections.  The turnover resulted from 
properties that added demand-response vehicles to their service,  and thus 
dropped out of the single-mode sample,  as well as turnover in properties 
appearing in the Section 15 data.  To control for the effects of wages, 
operating conditions,  and fleet composition on maintenance,  I estimate a 
log-linear approximation  of  (8)  scaled by capital services using ordinary 
least squares regression  (OLS). 
(9)  LNMAINT =  B, + B,LNSIZE + B,LNWAGE  + B,CITY  + B,ATE  + 
B,PRIVATE + B,NY  +  1  BiXi +  e 
The log of maintenance labor hours per 1,000  vehicle miles,  LNMAINT,  is 
regressed on the log of size,  the log of wage,  dummy variables for type of provider,  and a set of variables Xi  that control for technical and 
operating conditions and fleet composition.  The reported OLS  standard 
errors are corrected for correlation of errors across time periods using a 
covariance matrix constructed from the residuals of the cross-section OLS 
regressions.  While the OLS  results for the cross-sections  are not reported 
here in full, they yield results substantively identical to the pooled 
regressions, though with higher standard errors. 
A unique feature of this data set is its inclusion of a direct 
measure of maintenance effort:  vehicle maintenance labor hours.  This 
allows analysis of actual maintenance conducted as opposed to expenditures 
which are affected by variations in local price levels.  Many transit 
systems,  however, contract out for a portion of their maintenance.  To 
control for this,  I gross up the labor hours by the percent of maintenance 
expenses contracted out,  making the assumption that the labor component of 
contracted maintenance equals that done in-house.  Use of the adjusted 
measure, shown in table 2,  does not affect the analysis. 
A more significant potential problem with the use of the labor hours 
measure is the implicit assumption that total maintenance effort is in 
fixed proportion to labor hours.  As shown in table 2,  labor expenses, on 
average,  account for some 60 to 68 percent of total maintenance expenses 
for various types of providers,  with public transit authorities devoting 
64.1 percent of maintenance expenses for labor as opposed to 66.0 percent 
for ATE-managed systems and 67.8  percent for private systems.  While this suggests little variation in the composition of maintenance efforts across 
types of properties, it should be noted that the standard deviations of 
maintenance composition are large,  suggesting either reporting difficulties 
or some substitution between labor and capital in maintenance efforts.  At 
present,  however,  I have no indication that such difficulties bias a 
comparison  of maintenance efforts between types of providers and believe 
that the benefits of directly measuring the major maintenance input 
outweigh any disadvantages. 
Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations of independent 
variables used to control for wages,  operating conditions,  and fleet 
composition  (1984  cross-section  values only).  For a measure of wages,  I 
use the average hourly salary and fringe benefits paid to maintenance 
employees  (WAGE).  l3  While I do not have measures of equipment prices q, 
measures of discount rates 0, or preferences for new investment,  I  assume 
that the means of these variables shift only with respect to type of 
provider.  I therefore employ dummy variables for city government  (CITY), 
the ATE managed properties  (ATE)  and the privately owned properties 
(PRIVATE)  to pick up these effects.  Since more than half of the private 
observations come from the New York metropolitan region, a dummy variable 
(NY)  is included to pick up any fixed effect associated with this area. 
The variables measuring technical and operating conditions include 
systemwide annual mileage  (SIZE),  average speed  (SPEED),  the percentage of Table 3 
Operating Conditions,  Wages,  and Fleet Composition* 















Total annual mileage,  1,000  2,392 
(2,187) 
Hourly wage and fringe, $  12.57 
(4.91) 
Average speed,  MPH 
%  spare vehicles during 
peak operation 
Average annual miles per vehicle  35.2 
(14.6) 
Average vehicle age,  weighted  6.8 
by annual mileage  (3.6) 
%  of miles on leased vehicles  32.4 
(40.9) 
Collisions per 1,000  miles  0.049 
(0.031) 
Population density 
Property crimes per 1,000  persons  13.3 
(17.6) 
%  of miles on GMC buses, 
1977-1984 models 
%  of miles on GMC buses,  16.1 
1971-1976 models  (16.8) 
%  of miles on GMC buses,  14.8 
pre-1971 models  (14.6) 
%  of miles on MCI buses,  4.3 
intercity-type bus model  (12.3) 
AMGENERAL %  of miles on American Motors  0.0 
mid-1970s bus model  (0  .  0) Table 3  (cont.) 
Operating Conditions, Wages, and Fleet Composition* 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  PRIVATE  PUBLIC 
SMALL  %  of miles on  vehicles 
seating under 25 
MIDSIZE  %  of miles on vehicles 
seating 25-35 
* 1984 cross-section sample means  (standard  deviations). 
Source: author's  calculations. spare vehicles at the time of peak operation  (SPARES),  and average annual 
miles per vehicle  (MILES).  The percentage of miles run on leased vehicles' 
(LEASED)  is included since private firms, and some public properties,  often 
lease vehicles from public agencies.  The rate of vehicle collisions 
(CRASH),  population density  (DENSITY),  and property crime rate  (CRIME)  are 
included to measure congestion and hazardous operating conditions. 
While the above variables can be thought of as exogenous to the 
maintenance decision,  a set of potentially endogenous variables measuring 
fleet composition was also constructed.  The most important of these 
variables is the average age of the vehicle fleet weighted by annual 
mileage  (AGE).  This measures the age of the capital stock in use. 
Measures of the manufacturer,  vintage,  and type of vehicle are included to 
control for variation in the type and quality of equipment. 
While age and vintage of equipment affect the level of subsistence 
maintenance needed to keep the equipment running,  good preventive 
maintenance over time permits the operation of an older fleet.  Variables 
measuring age of equipment are therefore  potentially endogenous and could 
bias regression estimates.  The standard econometric solution for this 
problem is to instrument for the potentially endogenous variable with 
variables correlated with this variable, but uncorrelated with the error 
term.  Unfortunately,  I am aware of no obvious valid instruments and 
instead report both reduced-form regressions excluding the fleet 
composition variables, and larger regressions containing these potentially endogenous variables.  Results for the larger regressions should be 
interpreted with caution due to the potential bias. 
Table 4  reports four regression equations.  Regression  (1)  is a 
reduced-form specification  containing the set of operating variables but 
excluding the New York  (NY)  dummy variable and the age and fleet 
composition variables.  The estimated coefficient for PRIVATE,  0.237,  has a 
standard error of 0.064. It is highly significant,  suggesting that private 
operators conduct substantially more maintenance.  Inclusion of the NY 
dummy variable in (2),  however, reduces the estimated coefficient of 
PRIVATE to 0.165 with a standard error of 0.076.  This still represents a 
17 percent higher level of maintenance for privately owned systems than for 
public systems.  The estimated coefficients  (standard  errors) for the 1982, 
1983, and 1984 cross-section  regressions are 0.138 (0.905), 0.220 (0.108), 
and 0.151  (0.118), respectively. 
The large positive coefficient of NY can be interpreted in part to 
reflect the extreme operating conditions in the New York City area caused 
by heavy congestion and poor roads.  Because half of the observations for 
private operators occur in the New York area, it is not surprising that the 
NY dummy variable substantially reduces the private coefficient. 
The estimated coefficient for the ATE dummy is positive and 
significant in both  (1)  and (2),  indicating that ATE-managed properties Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression, 
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Number of Obs.  387  387  387  387 
Deg. of Freedom  374  373  371  3  64 
Sum of Sq. Res.  40.609  40.139  40.089  37.656 
R-  Squared  0.430  0.436  0.437  0.471 
NOTE: Dependent variable = log of maint. hours per 1,000  miles. 
Mean of dependent variable = 3.400 . 
* OLS standard errors corrected for correlation 
of errors across periods. 
Source: author's calculations. conduct some 12 percent more maintenance than other public systems.  This 
result holds in all of the regressions that follow.  The sign of the CITY 
dummy,  however,  is positive and insignificant,  in contrast to the 
prediction of the model.  The estimated elasticity of maintenance labor 
hours with respect to the maintenance wage ranges from -0.44  to  -0.46 in 
the regression results and is significant in all cases. 
Other variables in  (1)  and  (2)  include LEASED,  to control for leased 
equipment, and CRASH,  LNDENSE, and CRIME to control for adverse conditions 
associated with operation in the New York area.  The coefficient for LEASED 
is positive but insignificant.  The operating condition variables have the 
expected positive signs in most cases but are insignificant. 
Variables controlling for system characteristics appear to be 
important determinants of maintenance efforts.  Maintenance is increasing 
with the size of operation,  with an estimated elasticity of 0.141, 
suggesting diseconomies of scale in that a doubling of size raises 
maintenance hours 14 percent.  Maintenance decreases with the average speed 
of operation,  possibly due to less wear and tear of highway miles versus 
stop-and-go operation in congested areas.  Finally, two variables measuring 
equipment utilization,  SPARES and LNMILES,  enter with positive and negative 
estimated coefficients,  respectively.  All of the estimated coefficients 
for these variables are statistically significant. Regression  (3)  controls for the age-distribution  of the fleet 
entering AGE and AGE-squared to account for any nonlinearities associated 
with maintenance of aging equipment.  The estimated coefficients for these 
variables are of opposite sign,  suggesting an age-maintenance  profile in 
which maintenance efforts first increase,  then decrease with the age of 
equipment,  but are insignificant.  The coefficient for PRIVATE rises 
slightly to 0.168 and remains statistically significant. 
Regression  (4)  includes the fleet composition variables discussed 
previously.  GMC84 accounts for the percentage of miles run on the 
advanced-design  buses manufactured between 1977-1984,  while GMC76 and GMC70 
control for the workhorse new-look buses manufactured between 1971-1976 and 
pre-1970,  respectively.  The coefficients for GMC84 and GMC76 enter with 
positive but statistically insignificant coefficients,  while the GMC70 
coefficient enters with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.0004, suggesting that buses of this vintage on average 
require some 4  percent less maintenance.  The composition variables also 
control for mileage on small  (COMPACT)  and midsized vehicles  (MIDSIZE)  as 
well as mileage on intercity-type buses  (CRUISER)  and a mid-1970s model 
manufactured by American Motors  (AMGENERAL)  that is reported to have had 
significant maintenance problems.  The coefficients for MIDSIZE and CRUISER 
are positive and significant,  suggesting that controlling for operating 
conditions, these type of vehicles require greater levels of maintenance. 
The coefficient on AMGENERAL is estimated at 0.0020  with a t-statistic of 
1.56,  suggesting that these vehicles require 20 percent more maintenance on average.  Finally,  the results suggest that COMPACT vehicles require less 
maintenance than average. 
Inclusion of the fleet composition variables results in a flipping 
of the signs for AGE and AGE-squared,  suggesting an  age profile in which 
maintenance first decreases,  then increases with age.  These results are 
consistent with reported experience in the transit industry.  The 
coefficient  for PRIVATE in regression  (4)  declines to 0.141  with a t- 
statistic of 1.88. 
The results of these regressions suggest that private owners of 
transit capital devote some 14 to 17 percent greater resources to 
maintenance than do public owners of similar equipment.  This result 
survives controlling for wages and operating conditions as well as the age 
distribution and composition of the fleet,  suggesting that private 
maintenance efforts exceed the subsistence level needed to keep the fleet 
in operation. V.  Cross-State Variation in Capital Subsidv Policies 
While the analysis in section IV suggests that an important 
differential exists between the maintenance efforts of private versus 
public owners of capital, the zero/one nature of the experiment does not 
provide enough variation to estimate the impact of grant policies with any 
degree of confidence.  Models of bureaucratic behavior or political 
pressures could also explain the public/private differential.  To identify 
the price effects of capital subsidies, therefore,  I will use variations in 
grant policies across states. 
The federal Section 9 grant program subsidizes new capital purchases 
by public mass-transit providers at a rate of 80 percent.  This rate is 
constant across properties and effectively is a marginal subsidy for all 
public vehicle purchases.  Certain states,  however,  contribute up to 100 
percent of the local share, that is, the 20 percent not paid for with 
federal funds.  To identify those states which contributed capital funds at 
the margin, I  conducted a telephone survey of Departments of Transportation 
(DOTs) in the 29 states represented in the sample.  The information 
received was cross-checked  with a survey conducted by the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation  Officials  (1986).  Table 5 
presents survey results that categorize states by size of capital subsidy. 
Half of the state DOTs contacted report that they provide no direct subsidy 
for capital,  while seven states subsidize capital at a rate of 10 percent, 
or half of the local share,  two states subsidize capital at a rate between Table 5 
State Capital Subsidy Policies 
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Source: telephone survey by author. 10 and 20 percent,  and five states pick up the full local share, 
subsidizing new capital purchases at a rate of 20 percent. 
Through this survey I also identified a few instances where 
operating expenditures are subsidized on the margin.  While most states 
give transit operating subsidies on the basis of a formula unrelated to 
expenses or deficit,  Wisconsin,  Pennsylvania,  Connecticut,  and Illinois 
(for  downstate communities) cover a significant share of operating expenses 
at the margin.  Furthermore,  small transit systems in North Carolina and 
Georgia are subsidized on the margin by 50 percent through the Section 9 
federal funds controlled by the state governor. 
To conduct empirical analysis,  I  constructed a capital subsidy 
variable CAPSUB that equals the relative subsidy for capital faced by the 
local government. 
(1 -  GC,  -  G~,) 
CAPSUB = 
(1  -  GO,  -  GO,] 
For a local transit system receiving a 20 percent subsidy from the state as 
well as a 80 percent subsidy from the federal government,  the effective 
price of capital is zero.  The controlling factor in purchasing new capital in such cases are UMTA regulations regarding fleet size and minimum vehicle 
life.  Public properties are permitted a spare vehicle ratio of only 20 
percent at times of peak operation and are required to make buses last at 
least 12  years. 
To construct CAPSUB for private operators requires an estimate of 
the after-tax price of capital.  This can be defined as the price of 
investment minus any investment tax credit or gains from depreciation. 
CAPSUB for a private firm thus equals  (1  -  c -  rz) /  (1  -  7).  For this 
estimate I used a value of 0.10  for the investment tax credit c,  calculated 
the per-dollar present value of depreciation allowances rz for buses as 
0.41 using the ACRS tax rules,  and used the corporate tax rate of 0.46 for 
7. 
Table 6 reports results from the pooled reduced-form maintenance 
regressions that exclude the age and fleet composition variables but 
include CAPSUB.  In regression (I), which excludes both the PRIVATE and NY 
dummy variables, the estimated coefficient for CAPSUB is 0.251  with a 
standard error of 0.114.  When the NY variable is included, the CAPSUB 
variable is estimated at 0.158 with a standard error of 0.088.  This 
estimate suggests that a 100 percent subsidization of capital purchase 
results in a 16 percent reduction in vehicle maintenance.  This is the best 
estimate available,  because when the PRIVATE dummy variable is entered in 
(3), the CAPSUB  variable no longer has the power to distinguish a price 
effect.  The estimated coefficients of PRIVATE, NY, and CAPSUB are all Table 6 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Capital Subsidy 
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LNCRIME Table 6 (cont.  ) 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Capital Subsidy 
Variable, 1982-1984 Pooled Cross-Section* 
Number of Obs.  387  387  387 
Deg. of Freedom  3  74  373  372 
Sum of Sq. Res.  41.110  40.371  40.010 
R-  Squared  0.422  0.433  0.438 
NOTE: Dependent variable = log of maint. hours per 1,000  miles. 
Mean of dependent variable = 3.400 . 
* OLS standard errors corrected for correlation 
of errors across periods. 
Source: author's calculations. insignificant with the sign of CAPSUB reversing.  It appears,  however, that 
the PRIVATE variable dominates the CAPSUB variable when both are placed in 
the regression equation.  Since the estimated coefficient of CAPSUB is 
insignificant in the unrestricted regression (3),  the hypothesis that the 
correct regression specification excludes CAPSUB cannot be rejected.  The 
t-statistic of the PRIVATE variable in (3), however, is 1.53,  and the 
hypothesis that the correct regression specification excludes PRIVATE can 
be rejected at the 80 percent confidence level, though not at the 95 
percent level.  This suggests that there are influences other than price 
effects that lead private operators to devote higher levels of maintenance 
than public operators and supports the view that bureaucratic and political 
factors reduce maintenance efforts in the public sector. VI.  Conclusion 
This paper examines whether state and federal grant policies induce 
local governments to substitute new investment for the maintenance of 
existing capital.  An empirical analysis of the maintenance practices of 
local mass-transit providers shows that privately owned transit companies 
devote some 14 to 17 percent more labor hours to maintenance than do 
publicly owned and managed transit companies.  This result is robust under 
several specifications  controlling for wages, operating conditions, system 
characteristics,  and fleet composition. 
Noting that the federal government subsidizes new transit capital 
purchases in the public sector at a matching rate of 80 percent, the 
private/public differential and cross-state variation in grant policies are 
used to measure the elasticity of maintenance with respect to capital 
subsidies.  The point estimates suggest an elasticity of -0.16,  that is,  a 
10 percent increase in the subsidy rate for transit capital reduces vehicle 
maintenance by 1.6 percent.  The results are unable to distinguish, 
however,  between a price effect from capital subsidies versus a fixed 
effect associated with private operation.  Non-nested  hypothesis tests 
suggest that the fixed effect dominates and that influences other than 
price effects lead private operators to devote higher levels of maintenance 
than public operators.  This supports the view that bureaucratic and 
political factors reduce maintenance efforts in the public sector. While the results in this paper establish that private owners of 
transit capital devote significantly greater resources to maintenance than 
do public owners of similar capital, they do not necessarily demonstrate 
that public capital deteriorates at a faster rate than privately owned 
capital.  The higher levels of maintenance labor hours could be attributed 
to more capital-intensive maintenance practices.  Furthermore,  an implicit 
assumption that maintenance is qualitatively similar between the two 
sectors could be false.  If one sector fixes equipment upon failure,  as 
opposed to conducting preventive maintenance,  differences in overall 
maintenance levels could result.  A companion paper  (Cromwell,  1988), 
however, directly examines the scrappage and retirement rates of private 
versus public equipment to determine whether the higher maintenance in the 
private sector is reflected in longer equipment life. 
Using a panel of fleet data,  I examine the hazard rates for 
retirement and scrappage of public and private equipment.  A significant 
upward shift is seen in the scrappage rate for public vehicles at the 13- 
year point.  This shift is important because federal regulations require 
vehicles purchased with federal funds to remain active for at least 12 
years before replacement.  The fact that this response does not also occur 
in the private sector strongly suggests that it is caused by the drop in 
price of replacement at the 13-year mark for public vehicles as opposed to 
any underlying technical process of deterioration.  It is strong evidence 
that federal capital-grant policies lead to shorter equipment life in the 
local public sector and corroborates the evidence in this paper that public properties substitute new investment for the maintenance of existing 
capital. Endnotes 
1. For a review of this debate,  see Dudley and MontMarquette  (1984). 
2. For a review of the literature,  see Jorgenson  (1971). 
3. Decisions about utilization rates represent an important extension of 
this analysis not presented here. 
4. A variant of this model not presented here incorporates the fact that 
local governments can issue debt for new capital purchases, but finance 
maintenance from current revenues.  This condition affects the analysis 
when a local government is constrained in its ability to achieve some 
overall desired level of debt.  Gordon and Slemrod (1985),  however, 
argue that communities do not face such binding limits.  One potential 
limit on borrowing would be statutory limits set by the state specifying 
that the outstanding debt in a municipality cannot exceed some percent 
of the assessed property value of the community.  Separate limits, 
however,  are set for school bonds and for debt of special districts, so 
that creating special districts allows more debt to be issued.  In 
addition,  they argue,  some forms of debt are normally entirely exempt 
from these limits,  and states often provide a mechanism to relax a 
binding restriction on debt issues. 
5. This assumption avoids the complexities associated with the financial 
structure of the firm discussed in Stiglitz  (1973)  and King  (1975). 
6. In the zero price case,  local governments are constrained by federal 
regulations regarding minimum vehicle life and maximum size of fleet. 
See section 111. 
7. See UMTA  (1983). 
8. Figure cited is as of the 1983 report year. 
9. See UMTA  (1985). 
10. See Touche Ross  (1986). 
11. The provision of transit services by city governments as opposed to 
regional agencies is assumed to reflect the geographic area of service 
provision and state policies toward the creation of independent 
districts as opposed to tastes for maintenance.  Thus,  the provision of 
service by city government is assumed to be exogenous to the 
maintenance problem. 
12. Privately owned companies were identified using UMTA  (1986).  The 
survival of these private companies over a time when most were failing and being bought out by public agencies reflects local demand 
conditions for transit  (as  in the New York area) and policy decisions 
by local authorities not to get into the transit business,  in addition 
to the probability that they were well-run  properties.  I  assume that 
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policies. 
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